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 3 
2 Introduction  
 
So the question now is whether we will have the courage to act 
before it’s too late.  And how we answer will have a profound 
impact on the world that we leave behind not just to you, but to your 
children and to your grandchildren. As a President, as a father, and 
as an American, I’m here to say we need to act. (Obama, 2013b) 
 
Global warming is one of the most debated issues of our time. The scientific 
community seems to have reached a consensus on the impact of humans on the 
earth’s climate. It is suggested that 97% of all climate scientists agree that climate 
change is occurring, and that it is human-induced (Cook et al., 2016). However, this 
consensus is not accepted among politicians. Many politicians question whether 
climate change is happening and if so, what is causing it. The reliability of the 
scientific consensus has been questioned, creating a controversial debate especially in 
the United States (US) (McCright & Dunlap, 2011a).  
The idea that the election of a President influences the US climate policy is 
debated by most theories of International Relations (IR). These theories dismiss the 
role of the individual in examining a state’s behaviour. However, the climate change 
debate that has occurred in the US over the past decades creates ground to advocate 
the importance of individuals. Whilst writing this research, newly elected President 
Trump announced the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Climate accord (Liptak & 
Acosta, 2017). It was that same accord his predecessor, President Obama, worked so 
hard to achieve only two years prior (Clémençon, 2016). This example comes to show 
the importance of the President in office and his particular view on climate change. 
Therefore, the research question is: ‘what is the effect of the perception of the US 
president on climate change science, in other words, whether he is a believer or a 
denier, on the US climate policy?’ The research particularly wonders whether, unlike 
what IR theories suggest, individuals have influence on state-behaviour and policies. 
Studies that advocate the importance of the individual in state-behaviour will be 
discussed. For example, Hermann (2013) studied the importance of political 
psychology by establishing the connection between a leader’s personality and the 
policies of their institution. In this research, the role of individuals is applied to 
climate policies, and whether the perception of individuals fulfilling the duties of the 
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U.S. presidency matters to the particular policy outcome. If the results create grounds 
to assume that the perception of the US president on climate change science has a 
direct effect on the US climate policy, we can possibly conclude that the role of 
individuals is an important factor to consider when analysing state-behaviour. 
Analysing the perception and policies of President Bush and President Obama will 
test the effect that is questioned. These cases have contrasting independent variables, 
namely their perception of climate change science. Thus, the effect of their perception 
on climate policy shall be examined.  
The first part of the research elaborates on the issue of climate change and its 
political relevance. Next, alternative explanations from Grand IR theories shall be 
presented. Also, the relevance of the study of individuals will be further explored. 
After that, a theory and methodology shall be discussed. The results and analysis will 
first provide grounds to label both cases, President Bush and Obama, with a certain 
perception of climate change. Then, both presidents’ climate policy shall be analysed 
by looking at their greenhouse gas emission, environmental bills and international 
cooperation. Finally, the results shall be discussed and compared in the conclusion.  
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3 Literature Review  
3.1 Climate change: the debate 
 
The concept of ‘climate change’ points out to a change in weather patterns around the 
globe. It is a complex occurrence, and statements about its causes and consequences 
cannot be accepted with full certainty (Kirsti Maria Jylhä, 2016). The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reviews and assesses scientific 
research on the issue of climate change. Their reports do show a level of consensus 
among scientists. Researches indicate that today, 97% of climate scientists agree on 
the occurrence and the cause of climate change (Cook et al., 2016). This cause is 
argued to be human-induced greenhouse gas emissions (Kirsti M Jylhä, Cantal, 
Akrami, & Milfont, 2016). Also, scientists believe that mitigation is highly necessary 
on short term to prevent negative consequences of climate change to happen 
(Häkkinen & Akrami, 2014). Some examples of possible consequences are severe 
events that threaten the environment and human security, such as droughts, floods, 
and sea-level rise (Bernauer, 2013). The severity of these consequences for humanity 
connects climate science to politics. Climate scientists believe that in order to prevent 
disastrous events deriving from global warming, politician must act quickly by 
implementing international treaties and agreements (Bernauer, 2013). 
Although previously mentioned research indicates a high level of consensus 
among climate scientists on the issue of climate change, there is still a great discourse 
on it. Many politicians deny that climate change ought to be perceived as a threat to 
humanity, or even deny its occurrence (Häkkinen & Akrami, 2014). The topic has 
become primarily sensitive in politics for the high stakes it carries, possibly even 
posing a threat to human existence (McCright & Dunlap, 2011a). Therefore, 
managing the problem on a political level has proven to be difficult. What is seen as 
the foundation of the economy is also considered to be the cause of climate change, 
making the topic sensitive and difficult to address (Dessler & Parson, 2009). 
Reducing emissions will limit technological and economical productivity (Dessler & 
Parson, 2009). Even though reducing emission might be in the best interest for 
mankind in the long run, opposition of such such policies points out to its’ short-term 
economical disadvantages. All in all, the issue creates an arena for political conflict 
(Dessler & Parson, 2009). Thus, a debate has emerged between so-called ‘believers’ 
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and ‘deniers’ in climate change (Corry & Jørgensen, 2015). The believers argue that 
climate change is anthropogenic, and that politicians must act quickly to prevent 
further damage. The deniers of human-induced climate change worry about the 
economical costs of reducing emissions and argue that immediate action is thus 
unnecessary (Reddy & Assenza, 2009).   
The debate is a particularly difficult problem because climate is a collective 
good, and change requires action from all participants. Individual- and group goals of 
climate are disconnected, creating a ‘tragedy of the commons’ issue. The benefits and 
costs of collective actions are very asymmetrical, especially regarding the issue of 
climate change. The most severe impacts of climate change will most likely affect 
populations living in developing countries, as well as future generations. Thus, 
exactly those who are not responsible for human-induced climate change will suffer 
from it most (Bernauer, 2013). Large, rich states will on the other hand not feel severe 
consequences, for they have the ability to adapt to the situation (Bernauer, 2013).  
 
3.2 IR Theories 
 
Several IR theories can provide an explanation for political behaviour in the climate 
change issue. Realism has been one of the most influential theories in international 
relations (Luterbacher & Sprinz, 2001). Realists assume that the international system 
is anarchical and that individual states aim to maximise their own interests. States 
strive primarily to strengthen their power to gain a better position in the international 
system and ensure their survival (Mingst & Snyder, 2001). Traditional realism 
assumes that international cooperation can usually not succeed, and if it does this 
cooperation would only serve as a power balance (Luterbacher & Sprinz, 2001). 
Neorealism emerged later in the twentieth century, arguing that cooperation between 
states is possible provided it is concerning political economy. It remained pessimistic 
about cooperation on other fields (Luterbacher & Sprinz, 2001). Keohane (1980) 
argues that in order for international cooperation to succeed, a single state dominating 
the power struggle must exist and be willing to use its resources to solve collective 
issues. This theory is labelled the ‘hegemonic stability theory’ (Keohane, 1980).  
When applying the neorealist theory of international relations to the issue of 
climate change, the success or failure of international cooperation depends on the 
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distribution of power among states. Both military and economic measures of power 
could be used to achieve common international policy changes. According to 
neorealism, the response to the issue of climate change is determined by the hegemon 
(Luterbacher & Sprinz, 2001). In the current international system, the United States is 
commonly identified as the hegemonic power (Keohane, 2005). When assuming the 
United States is the ‘climate hegemon’ neorealism would argue that uniform 
international climate policy, resulting from cooperation, will reflect the United States’ 
interests on the issue. This is because neorealism argues that successful international 
cooperation can only succeed when a hegemon exists and is willing to use its power 
to solve the collective issue. Therefore, the outcome of international cooperation 
should be parallel to the preferences of the hegemon on the specific issue. 
(Luterbacher & Sprinz, 2001). Arguably, proof of this neorealist assumption can be 
found in the outcomes of the 1997 Climate Change Convention in Kyoto, Japan. The 
convention contains many aspects that were initialized by the US, and serve no other 
states’ interest. The fact that the final Kyoto Protocol reflects primarily US 
preferences, indicates that the hegemonic stability theory (Keohane, 1980) might 
indeed be applicable to this particular case (Luterbacher & Sprinz, 2001).   
The climate issue can also be viewed from a rational choice theory 
perspective, especially when looking at the ‘logic of collective action’ (Olson, 1965) . 
Olson (1965) explains that rational individuals will not cooperate to contribute to 
group benefit if their personal costs are higher than their benefit. Individuals will thus 
not voluntarily contribute to the environmental protection as a common good 
(Pelikaan, 2015). Olson argues that the logic of collective action theory is the best 
theoretical framework to look at the behaviour of individuals (Olson, 1965). His 
theory uses democratic participation as an example. According to his logic, it is never 
rational for citizens to vote in mass elections (Pelikaan, 2015). Fundamental proof of 
the failure of this theory is found in practice: the fact that most democratic citizens do 
vote in reality. This is known as the ‘paradox of the voter turnout’ (Pelikaan, 2015). 
This issue is comparable to the issue of climate change. States can decide to 
contribute to group objective, that is in this case implementing sustainable policy and 
reducing emission, and support the collective good. However, when applying Olsons’ 
(1965) theory of collective action it can be concluded that supporting the collective 
good is not a rational choice. Thus, according to rational choice theory climate 
accords will fail, for the individual costs are higher then the benefits.  
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 The IR theories discussed, provide explanations for the success or failure of 
the US climate policy. However, there are limitations to the explanations provided by 
both (neo)realism and rational choice theory. How do they explain differences in 
climate policies of individual presidents? To answer this question, further exploration 
of the theories that provide explanations for individual influence on policy matters in 
necessary.  
 
3.3 The role of Individuals 
 
Both (neo)realism and rational choice theory can provide an explanation for the 
success or failure of international cooperation of the climate change issue. However, 
both theories lack a certain level of analysis that is argued to be of great importance to 
the course of international cooperation. This research argues that the individual level 
must be analysed too in order to fully understand the behaviour of states in 
international cooperation on climate change. This becomes particularly clear when 
further observing the earlier mentioned Kyoto Protocol (1997) and the US hegemonic 
position. When President George W. Bush took office in 2001 his administration 
immediately announced their withdrawal from further cooperation, for it would hurt 
the US economy (Christoff, 2006). Despite the fact that the protocol included several 
elements that represented primarily US interests, the Bush Administration retracted 
from the initiative (Luterbacher & Sprinz, 2001). It took one man to change the view 
of the hegemonic power from being in favour of the protocol, to abandoning it. 
However, when in 2009 President Barack Obama was elected, the US once again 
changed its climate policy towards acting up as a hegemon to secure international 
agreement on the issue (Osofsky, 2011). How can theories of IR ignore the role of 
individuals when in this particular example, practise seems to prove that it really 
matters who is sitting in the oval office?  
Thus, IR theories ought to be viewed from a broader perspective than just 
state-level. Individual leaders can have a significant influence on the role their state 
plays in international politics (Hermann & Hagan, 1998). Early literature in political 
science focussed on power relationships between states, however leadership was 
barely mentioned. Even when leadership did become noticed factor in international 
relations theory the role of personality was rarely taken into account. Rather, the 
 9 
leaders were assumed to be rational and predictive in their decision-making (Post & 
George, 2004). Hermann (1998) explains why individual leadership started playing a 
more prominent role in the post-Cold War era. She argues that there is nowadays a 
more flexible world order compared to the bipolar system during the cold war. Early 
scholars of international politics often dismissed the importance of political leaders’ 
direct influence on foreign policy, for the power-structures in international politics 
were set and the decisions that leaders could make always had to be in line with those 
structures “because the systematic imperatives of anarchy or interdependence are so 
clear, leaders can choose from only a limited range of foreign policy strategies” 
(Hermann & Hagan, 1998, p. 124). However, Hermann argues, the post-Cold War era 
is not as clearly structured in anarchy and power relations between states. This 
provides room for interpretation and communication of political leaders and explains 
why individual leaders have become more influential (Hermann & Hagan, 1998). 
McDermott (2013) also points out to the dominance of state-actions during the Cold 
War. This explains why there was never much attention for the field of individual 
political leadership. According to her, the attention for levels of analysis beyond that 
of the state rose again when after the Cold War the role of non-state actors became 
more prominent (McDermott, 2013). These studies prove why the direct influence of 
leaders on policy making is worth studying, and the individual level of analysis must 
be taken into account more often when analysing international relations.  
Nowadays, news and social media are filled with political leaders and the way 
they behave individually. With the 2016 US elections just behind us, it is difficult to 
disagree with Hermann & Hagan (1998). The US is taking on a very different attitude, 
primarily when it comes to foreign affairs, now that the Republican President Trump 
has replaced Democrat Obama. President Obama viewed climate as a top priority, and 
played a significant role in establishing an international agreement in Paris on climate 
change (Clémençon, 2016). Only a week prior to the submission of this research, 
President Trump announced the US withdrawal of the Paris Climate Accord (Liptak 
& Acosta, 2017). Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that international relations 
theories cannot successfully predict a state’s behaviour without also looking at the 
individual making those decisions, instead of using only the state-level analysis. The 
level of analysis in international relations research must shift from state-level only, to 
the group- and individual level.  
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All in all, the focus is mainly on the importance of behaviour of leaders. What 
factors drive this behaviour? Hermann (2013) attempts to establish a link between 
political leaders’ characteristics and their actions, to examine if these factors influence 
each other. These characteristics include factors such as leadership style, basic 
political beliefs background factors and more (Hermann, 2013). In short, she argues 
that personality influences decision-making. Another study conducted by Barber 
(1972) provides information on the importance of the individual behaviour of the US 
president. Among other factors, the person who is the President and his personal view 
weigh heavily in the direction of the US international policy (Barber, 1972). 
 
The degree and quality of a president’s emotional involvement in an 
issue are powerful influences on how he defines the issue itself, how 
much attention he pays to it, which facts and persons he sees as 
relevant to its resolution, and finally, what principles and purposes 
he associates with the issue. (Barber, 1972: 281) 
 
Saunders (2009) argues that in order to understand state-intervention one must 
not overlook the crucial role of individuals. According to her research leaders play a 
crucial role in deciding on how their state will respond to certain threats. By 
comparing two cases Saunders (2009) illustrates that leaders perceive fundamental 
issues such as security threats differently, which affects the way they respond to it. 
The individual leaders perception of threat is thus fundamental to explain the effect 
(Saunders, 2009). Saunders’ (2009) research can be applied to climate change in the 
US politics. It indicates that the perceptions leaders have of certain issues, especially 
those involving security matters, are of great importance in predicting their response. 
It has been pointed out to prior in this study, that leaders in the US have contrasting 
perceptions of the dangers of climate change.  
As mentioned, a debate has emerged in politics between believers and deniers 
of climate change science (Corry & Jørgensen, 2015). These two camps argue over 
the reliability of scientific claims on the reasons and consequences of human-caused 
climate change. It has become clear that the topic of climate change is not only an 
important phenomenon inside the scientific field, it must not be underestimated in the 
governmental field either (Corry & Jørgensen, 2015). Climate science has found its 
way into politics, and individual leaders have responded very differently to it. 
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Especially in the US, the two-party system seems to create an environment of 
disagreement on the issue. Dunlap and McCright (2008) argue that the partisan gap in 
the US is nowhere more evident then on this specific issue (Dunlap & McCright, 
2008). The Republican Party is highly unconvinced of the evidence of human-caused 
global warming and thus takes a sceptical standpoint, whereas the Democratic Party-
members grant themselves the title ‘believers’ (Dunlap & McCright, 2008). For the 
purpose of this research only ‘believing’ and ‘denying’ shall be accounted as possible 
views on climate change. One could possibly wonder if there is a direct relationship 
between the U.S. presidents’ perception of climate change, thus whether he is a 
believer or a denier, and the U.S. climate policy. Does the president have direct 
influence on the U.S. climate policy, and perhaps even on international climate 
agreements such as Kyoto and Paris? If so, this would be in strong contrast with the 
expectations of IR theories on policy making.  
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4 Theory 
 
The concepts of climate ‘believer’ and ‘denier’, or as stated in the research question 
‘perception of climate change science’, require special attention. As mentioned 
before, we can distinguish two groups in the climate debate, namely believers and 
deniers (Reddy & Assenza, 2009). Several other labels have been used in previous 
research to appoint the debating views in US politics on the issue, such as sceptics 
and supporters. Kirsti (2016) explains why the labels denier and believer are more 
suitable to establish the groups in this debate. Scepticism refers to an indecisive 
position towards a certain claim, which is common in testing scientific objectivity. 
However, publicly opposing a claim cannot be called sceptical, for the term has a 
contrasting definition (Kirsti Maria Jylhä, 2016). All scientists, even the ones that 
believe in human-induced climate change, ought to be sceptical about their findings 
because critically judging empirical objectivity and challenging predictions and 
conclusions are simply part of science (Kirsti Maria Jylhä, 2016). Therefore, in this 
research the term denial shall be applied. The label suggests that individuals in this 
group actively deny the existence of climate change. However, in this research the 
label for a wide range of people who question the integrity of science indicating that 
climate change is human-induced. Thus, for the purpose of this research, being 
labelled a denier does not necessarily mean that this individual has directly denied the 
existence of it. Rather, it indicates the individual questions the anthropogenic cause of 
climate change and the integrity of climate research. 
The two views disagree on the cause of climate change, and on what 
governments must do about it or not. Believers argue that climate change is 
anthropogenic, and that politicians must act quickly to prevent further damage. The 
deniers of human-induced climate change worry about the economical costs of 
reducing emissions and argue that immediate action is thus unnecessary (Reddy & 
Assenza, 2009). Previous research indicates that there are different factors that could 
lead to climate change denial. Exposure to climate change information and ideology 
variables, such as social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism, are 
examples of these indicators (Häkkinen & Akrami, 2014). The National Centre for 
Science Education (NCSE) distinguishes 3 pillars of climate change denial (Rosenau, 
2012). The first pillar attacks the scientific consensus on climate change by arguing 
that climate science is bad science. NCSE points out to the different types of deniers, 
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some acknowledging the occurrence of climate change yet denying the anthropogenic 
responsibility, and some denying its occurrence in total. The second pillar claims that 
“acceptance of climate change is driven by radical ideological motivations and leads 
to undesirable social consequences” (Rosenau, 2012: n.d.) . This pillar includes the 
strong correlation in the US between climate science denial and political conservatism 
(McCright & Dunlap, 2011b). McCright & Dunlap (2011a) also describe the ‘white 
male effect’, which suggests that conservative white males are more accepting of risks 
than other adults due to socio-political explanations. The research particularly focuses 
on the identity-protective cognition thesis as an explanation for the ‘white male 
effect’ (McCright & Dunlap, 2011a). White males tend to have a hierarchical cultural 
worldview, and perceive environmental risks as challenging the existing hierarchy 
(McCright & Dunlap, 2011a). Their research results state that “significantly greater 
percentages of conservative white males than of all other American adults report 
denialist views” (McCright & Dunlap, 2011a: 5). Finally, the last pillar of the NCSE 
states that climate science deniers claim there is a certain fairness about pointing out 
to scientific controversy over climate change, for it highlights both sides of the issue. 
Rosenau (2012) himself argues that this last pillar is particularly insidious, because it 
falsely assumes that there even is a scientific controversy over climate change, even 
though in reality there is a scientific consensus (Rosenau, 2012). Other research 
results suggest that the core of the climate change debate is found in cultural 
polarization and political mobilization (Hoffman, 2011). Identification with one of the 
groups and specific behaviour towards the other can be understood as expressions 
supporting a specific social identity. Deniers’ group consciousness consists primarily 
of anger towards believers. Furthermore, deniers are more likely to be Republicans 
and tend to advocate their conservative moral values. Also, deniers often have a 
higher level of national identification (Hoffman, 2011). On the other hand believers 
are more likely to be Democrats. Contrary to deniers, they tend to have a high level of 
human identification that goes beyond the US borders. They are also more likely to 
express feelings of guilt, fear and hopelessness towards the future and their offspring 
(Hoffman, 2011).  
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5 Research Design 
5.1 Methodology 
 
In this research, President George W. Bush and his perception and policy shall be 
compared to those of President Barack Obama. By determining both Presidents’ 
position on climate change science and comparing their foreign policy on climate 
change cooperation, this research aims to find a relationship between the Presidents’ 
view and the U.S. climate policy, and perhaps the success or failure of international 
cooperation. In this case, the dependent variable is the US (foreign) climate policy. 
The independent variable is the President’s perception of climate change science 
(believers/denier).  
To establish a link between a US presidents’ position on climate change science 
and his foreign policy, it is necessary to find a methodology suitable to compare the 
cases. Therefore, a comparative research method shall be used. Within this type of 
method, a distinction is made between the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) and 
the Most Different Systems Design (MDSD) (Anckar, 2008). The MSSD compares 
two cases that are as similar as possible in as many features of their system as 
possible. On the contrary, a MDSD seeks to present the strength or weakness of a 
relationship between two variables by testing their validity in a range of two or more 
different settings (Hague & Harrop, 2013). In this study two cases that are very 
similar in their system-type, however differ in one variable: the president. Therefore, 
the study shall make us of a MSSD.  
 One of the strengths of a comparative case study as will be used in this 
research, is the ability to broaden understanding of the issue to more than just one 
case. Also, comparison is strong in finding political structures and processes and 
presents us with potential for prediction (Hague & Harrop, 2013). If the research 
finds, say, that a US president who is a ‘believer’ has an active climate policy, it can 
reasonably, yet with careful consideration, predict that perception of climate change 
science of the president has an effect on climate policy.  
The method of comparing cases also has weaknesses. Keeping in mind the 
weaknesses of comparative case studies enhances the vision of the research. First of 
all, it is important to note that certain phenomena can have different interpretations in 
different cases. Second, comparative case study has a large change of selection bias, 
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for the cases are often not found at random. A problem with having two individuals as 
variables, is that they are impossible to objectively compare. (Hague & Harrop, 
2013).  
 
5.2 Case selection 
 
Two Presidents will be analysed to examine the effect of the perception of the US 
president on climate change science, so whether he is a believer or a denier, on the US 
climate policy and international climate cooperation. These are President George W. 
Bush and President Barack Obama. These two particular cases have been selected for 
several reasons. First of all, both Presidents took office in a time where climate 
change was a so-called ‘hot topic’. Media, Non-Governmental Organizations and 
international organisations all paid much attention to the issue during their office-
periods. Also, these presidents took office in a comparable historical timeframe, 
which partly eliminates other factors that could influence their view on climate 
change such as scientific knowledge, economic development and social norms and 
values of particular times. However, what makes the cases particularly interesting to 
compare is the expectation of the presidents’ different views on the causes of climate 
change. Human-induced climate change is argued to be the result of long-term 
globalization (O’Brien & Leichenko, 2000). Bush seems to have pushed the issue of 
climate change down the political agenda, for he denied that globalisation issues 
where changing the international political arena. On the contrary, Obama took 
globalisation issues as a given and made climate one of his primary concerns both 
during his campaign as during his time in office (Lindsay, 2011). An effective 
example of this is found in the Leage of Conservation Voters (LCV) rate, which is a 
way to measure a congressional member’s environmental standpoint. This rate intends 
to indicate the percentage of pro-environment votes of a Congressional member in 
relation to its total amount of votes related to the environment that year (Dunlap & 
McCright, 2008). Absence of voting is regarded a negative vote. The rate can range 
from 0 to 100 and there are different issue categories measured. Obama’s lifetime 
LCV score is 86, which is remarkably high (Gerrard, 2008). However, it must be 
noted that being a congressional member is not the same as being the president. Once 
elected president, actual executed policy might differ from expectations according to 
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the LCV score. However, it is an interesting indicator to measure an individuals’ 
standpoint on climate change.  
Bush and Obama are similar cases that have been selected with the objective to 
achieve maximum variance through their single difference (Seawright & Gerring, 
2008). The method aims to represent the broader variable relationship. In other words, 
these cases have been selected to hopefully be able to generalise that Presidents 
labelling themselves ‘believers’ create different climate policy then the ones labelled 
‘deniers’. However, the small amount of cases creates a research that is difficult to 
generalize completely. There is no guarantee that both individuals are completely 
representative for their category, thus that generalization is possible. Also, US climate 
policy could be affected by many other factors then just the perception of the 
president on the matter. Nevertheless, the research aims to prove the presence of an 
effect between both variables mentioned in the research question. This effect can exist 
regardless of what other factors might influence the dependant variable (Seawright & 
Gerring, 2008).  
 
5.3 Data selection & Operationalization 
 
The first part of the research provides arguments to grant both Bush and Obama a 
perception ‘status’ of either climate science believer or denier. Primary data such as 
speeches will be used, as well as secondary data such as other research indicating that 
certain people are more likely to identify with one of the labels. This data is relevant 
because first of all, speeches on climate change indicate clearly the view of the 
president speaking. Second, other research has shown that there is a relation between 
certain characteristics (possessed by one of the cases) and climate change denial. 
Therefore, this data is relevant to study the perception of the two US presidents on 
climate change science. In the second part of this research, primary data shall be 
analysed to see whether this perception has had an effect on the U.S. climate policy. 
These will present Congressional bills and greenhouse gas emission during Bush and 
Obama’s terms, to identify their influence on the US climate policy. Also, secondary 
data will be used to look at the role of the US president in reaching international 
climate agreements, such as Kyoto and Paris.  
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6 Results & Analysis 
 
6.1 Part I: Perception of climate change science  
 
6.1.1 President George W. Bush 
 
In chapter 4 we have identified the concept of climate change denier. Bushes’ 
perception of climate change science is less obvious than President Obama’s. The 
reason for it being less obvious is that Bush, to a certain extent, claims to be a 
believer. However, there are reasons to believe that Bush did not believe in human-
induced climate change, and that his administration did not encourage climate 
science. The following citation from a presidential speech in 2001 indicates that 
President Bush was determined to handle the issue of climate change seriously: 
 
Last month, I announced the fundamental principles to guide a 
scientifically sound and effective global effort to reduce the 
buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. As I said then, my 
Administration’s climate change policy will be science-based, 
encourage research breakthroughs that lead to innovation, and 
take advantage of the power of markets. It will encourage global 
participation and will pursue actions that will help ensure 
continued economic growth and prosperity for our citizens and for 
citizens throughout the world. 1 (Bush, 2001a)  
 
 There are indications that create doubt about President Bushes’ true 
perception of climate change science. First of all, although the 2001 inauguration 
speech might suggest that Bush was determined to tackle the issue of climate change, 
many see this as a cover-up for his true intentions (Dunlap & McCright, 2010). Bush 
has questioned the integrity of climate science, and called for new research to 
determine the reality of it (Harris, 2009). Furthermore, in the speech terms such as 
‘scientifically sound’ are used, implying that previous science outcomes had been 
‘unsound’ (Dunlap & McCright, 2010). Also, he stated to believe that humans were to 
                                                        
1 Presiden Bush’ statement on Climate Change, July 13 2001. Retrieved from: https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/07/20010713-2.html 
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blame for climate change only to some extent, suggesting there are other factors 
contributing to the problem (“BBC NEWS | Bush rejects Kyoto-style G8 deal,” 2005). 
In the following passage from a speech in 2001 on climate change, Bush’s doubts 
become clear: 
 
Yet, the Academy's report tells us that we do not know how much 
effect natural fluctuations in climate may have had on warming. We 
do not know how much our climate could, or will change in the 
future. We do not know how fast change will occur, or even how 
some of our actions could impact it. For example, our useful efforts 
to reduce sulfur emissions may have actually increased warming, 
because sulfate particles reflect sunlight, bouncing it back into space. 
And, finally, no one can say with any certainty what constitutes a 
dangerous level of warming, and therefore what level must be 
avoided. The policy challenge is to act in a serious and sensible way, 
given the limits of our knowledge. (Bush, 2001b) 
 
In his speech, Bush repeatedly points out to the uncertainties and limits of the 
knowledge on climate change. He actively expresses his doubt on the reality of 
science (Bush, 2001b) 
The characteristics mentioned in the ‘white male effect’ fit President Bush 
perfectly (McCright & Dunlap, 2011a). Bush is a considered a conservative 
Republican (Preston, 2004). Conservative US politicians have always been willing to 
accept sceptic views on climate change (Dunlap & McCright, 2010). However, Bush 
being a conservative white male obviously does not create enough grounds to grant 
him the status of being a climate change denier.  Therefore, some other indicators 
shall be discussed that add to the plausibility of Bush inclining to be a denier.  
Another indication of Bush being a denier of climate change is his nationalist 
policy. The Bush administration is perceived to use American nationalism in their 
foreign policy, advocating Western democracy throughout the world. This view 
suggests that democracy is inseparable from national identity (Monten, 2005). As 
Bush said in his acceptance speech at the Republican Convention in 2004:  
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The story of America is the story of expanding liberty: an ever-
widening circle, constantly growing to reach further and include 
more. Our nation's founding commitment is still our deepest 
commitment: In our world, and here at home, we will extend the 
frontiers of freedom. 2 (Bush, 2004) 
 
Implications of Bush’s nationalist view can be derived from this citation. For 
example, the drive to “extend the frontiers of freedom” (Bush, 2004) suggests his 
belief that more states ought to be like the US. Hoffman (2011) suggests this premise 
of strong identification with the nation, is more likely to be found in a denier.  
(Hoffman, 2011).   
 Although the assumption of Bush being a denier does not align with the words 
spoken by Bush himself, the examples make it reasonable to label him as a one. Even 
though it does not prove definitively that Bush is a denier of climate change science, 
it has been made very plausible to assume that he is.  
 
 
6.1.2 President Barack Obama 
 
Now that we have established Bush’s perception of climate change, the focus shifts to 
President Obama. President Obama is well known for his strong pro-climate beliefs. 
Since his first campaign, environmental issues have stood high on his agenda (Obama, 
2013b).  Judging from his speeches, President Obama would appear to be the perfect 
‘believer’. He has always rooted for reduction in greenhouse gas emission and creating 
new energy supplies (Obama, 2013b). He even personally visited a woman in 
Nebraska to discuss the issue, after she had written him a concerned letter about the 
future of her son on our planet (Mosbergen, 2016). The following quote strengthens 
the idea that Obama is a firm believer: 
 
Look, if anybody still wants to dispute the science around climate 
change, have at it. You will be pretty lonely, because you’ll be 
debating our military, most of America’s business leaders, the 
                                                        
2 President's Remarks at the 2004 Republican National Convention, September 2, 2004. Retrieved from: 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040902-2.html 
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majority of the American people, almost the entire scientific 
community, and 200 nations around the world who agree it’s a 
problem and intend to solve it. 3 (Obama, 2016) 
 
According to results that have been outlined in chapter 4 climate change 
believers have several characteristics. First of all, climate believers are more likely to 
be Democrats, engaging in liberal worldviews (Hoffman, 2011). Contrary to the 
tendency of deniers to lean towards a more nationalist view, believers are more likely 
to identify with humanity as a whole (Hoffman, 2011). Furthermore, Hoffman (2011) 
suggests that believers often express feelings of fear and guilt towards future 
generations and the planet. In the following citation from Obama’s second Inaugural 
address in 2013 nearly all of these characteristics are detectable: 
 
We, the people, still believe that our obligations as Americans are 
not just to ourselves, but to all posterity. We will respond to the 
threat of climate change, knowing that the failure to do so would 
betray our children and future generations. Some may still deny the 
overwhelming judgment of science, but none can avoid the 
devastating impact of raging fires and crippling drought and more 
powerful storms. The path towards sustainable energy sources will 
be long and sometimes difficult. But America cannot resist this 
transition, we must lead it. We cannot cede to other nations the 
technology that will power new jobs and new industries, we must 
claim its promise. That’s how we will maintain our economic vitality 
and our national treasure -- our forests and waterways, our croplands 
and snow-capped peaks. That is how we will preserve our planet, 
commanded to our care by God. That’s what will lend meaning to 
the creed our fathers once declared4 (Obama, 2013a).  
 
The first sentence of this citation indicates Obama’s identification with 
                                                        
3 Remarks of President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address, January 13, 2016. Retrieved from: 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/01/12/remarks-president-barack-obama-–-prepared-
delivery-state-union-address 
4 President Obama, Second Inaugural Address, January 21, 2013. Retrieved from: 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/21/inaugural-address-president-barack-obama 
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humanity, immediately including emotions and personal statements. The 
second sentence suggests his feeling of responsibility and guilt towards future 
generations. All in all, it seems very plausible to assume Obama is a firm 
climate science believer.  
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6.2 Part II: Climate policy 
 
6.2.1 President George W. Bush 
 
Although the claim to aim at a science-based climate change policy appears to be that 
of a believer, we have established that there is some indication that leads to doubt 
about his true perception. This section of the research will test Bushes’ climate policy 
judging from greenhouse gas emissions, environmental bills and international 
cooperation during his presidency.  
 Figure 1 presents the emissions of greenhouse gases by the US during the 
presidency of Bush. Except for 2008, there is hardly reduction of greenhouse gases 
detectable in this graph. The overall course of the line is upwards rather then 
downwards, the latter being what Bush claimed to aim at when discussing climate 
policy (Bush, 2001). Thus, from this graph we can conclude that President Bush 
failed on reducing greenhouse gas emission in the US.  
 
Figure 1. “Greenhouse gas emission during presidency of Bush” 
 
Data retrieved from: 
https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/inventoryexplorer/#allsectors/allgas/econsect/all 
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Particularly striking about this data is that the amount of Environmental protection 
Bills discussed during the two terms of Bush, is very high. However, none of these 
bills were about climate change and greenhouse gases, nor were enacted by the 
president. All four congresses constituted during Bush’s term had a Republican 
majority (“Composition of Congress, by Political Party, 1855-2017”). This means that 
Bush was most likely supported in most of his agenda points. According to Harris 
(2009) the Bush Administration actively worked to “weaken and undermine domestic 
environmental laws and regulations” (Harris, 2009, p. 967) during both terms. Figure 
2 graphically presents the data on the environmental legislation during Bushes’ term 
as president. Although during the presidency of Bush many environmental Bills were 
discussed in Congress, none of them seem to have made the cut. Also, out of all the 
bills that went through Congress, not one was particularly about climate change and 
greenhouse gas. From this information the conclusion can be drawn that President 
Bush did not contribute to legislation of climate policy aimed at reducing climate 
change and greenhouse gas emissions (“Environmental Protection Bills - 
GovTrack.us,”).  
 
Figure 2. “Bills in the U.S. Congress related to the subject Environmental 
Protection during the presidency of Bush” 
 
 
Data retrieved from 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/subjects/environmental_protection/6038#congress=__ALL__ 
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Harris (2009) studied the role the US has taken in environmental policies. 
According to him, the US acted as a leader in environmental cooperation between 
states at the end of the twentieth century. With the election of Bush, the US role 
shifted. Environmental policies fell behind and Europe emerged as environmental 
front runner (Harris, 2009). Before Bush was elected, the Clinton administration 
successfully reached an international agreement on climate change. This international 
agreement was called the Kyoto protocol, and it included emission targets and time 
limits for governments. The Kyoto protocol was based on the principle of common, 
yet differentiated responsibilities (Clémençon, 2016).  Even though President Clinton 
had not fulfilled all of his campaign promises about the environment, Bush appeared 
to fall short to a far greater extent. Bush’s administration actively attempted to reverse 
any steps taken in previous decades (Harris, 2009). After his election in 2001, Bush 
immediately renounced any plans to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions as stated in 
the Kyoto protocol. Bush stated the US no longer had the intention of ratifying the 
protocol (McCright & Dunlap, 2003). The administration argued that the Kyoto 
agreement placed too much burden on developed countries, and that none of their 
actions would make a difference as long as emerging economies would not be held 
accountable for their emissions (Clémençon, 2016). The US retrieval from the 
international agreement was one of the main reasons the overall protocol failed 
(Clémençon, 2016). It is argued that a conservative movement led to the US failure to 
ratify the protocol (McCright & Dunlap, 2003).  
Bush received a fair amount of criticism on his climate policy. From the 
perspective of environmentalists Bush miserably failed for his environmental record, 
for withdrawing policies that protect air and water from pollution and encouraging oil 
exploration in wildlife areas (Bosso & Guber, 2006). The Bush administration was 
accused of hiding behind a handful of environmental achievements, which were in 
fact made possible by years of previous administration’s work (Bosso & Guber, 
2006). Another accusation aimed at the Bush administration involved political 
interference with the work of government climate scientists 5  (Grifo, 2007). In a 
written testimony Grifo (2007) releases the results of a survey conducted by over 
1800 federal scientists. The results of the survey indicate a severe problem with 
                                                        
5 This testimony is presented by Dr. Francesca Grifo, Senior Scientist with the Union of Concerned Scientists 
(UCS), a leading science-based non-profit working for a healthy environment and a better world. 
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political interference in federal climate science, endangering the scientific integrity6. 
Nearly half of the respondents that work on climate science experienced political 
pressure to change words such as ‘climate change’ and ‘global warming’. Also, 
researches were challenged and edited to change the meaning of results and scientists 
experienced unusual obstacles during their research (Grifo, 2007). Some critics even 
went as far as accusing the Bush administration of engaging in a ‘war on science’ 
(Doremus, 2007). In chapter 4, the three pillars of denial by the NCSE were outlined. 
This strong criticism on President Bush fits perfectly into the first pillar of attacking 
the scientific consensus on climate change (Rosenau, 2012). McCright and Dunlap 
(2010) argue that the Bush Administration engaged in the active suppression of 
climate scientists to justify their eight years of neglecting the issue. According to 
them, behaviour of the Bush Administration has encouraged and normalized the 
acceptance of climate change denial in Republican leadership (Dunlap & McCright, 
2010). 
 
 
6.2.2 President Barack Obama 
  
For I believe, in the words of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., that there 
is such a thing as being too late.  And when it comes to climate 
change, that hour is almost upon us.  But if we act here, if we act 
now, if we place our own short-term interests behind the air that 
our young people will breathe, and the food that they will eat, and 
the water that they will drink, and the hopes and dreams that 
sustain their lives, then we won't be too late for them. 
7
 (Obama, 
2015) 
 
At the beginning of Obama’s second term as President of the US he bundled 
his climate goals and established a ‘Climate action plan’. In this plan the second 
Obama administration outlined their policy on climate change; what had been 
                                                        
6 The survey focuses on the period 2002-2007 
7 Remarks by President Obama at the First Session of COP21, November 30 2015, Paris, France. Retrieved 
from: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/30/remarks-president-obama-
first-session-cop21 
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established in the first term, what were the new goals and how would they be 
established? The plan focuses primarily on two points that are used in this research to 
measure the president’s climate policy; greenhouse gas emissions and international 
efforts to combat global climate change and the US role in these efforts (Obama, 
2013b).  
 Reduction of greenhouse gas emission was one of the main goals of the 
Obama Administration climate policy (Obama, 2013b). This goal was supposed to be 
established by moving the economy towards relying on American-made clean energy 
sources (Obama, 2013b). Figure 3 proves that during Obama’s presidency the US 
greenhouse gas emission was indeed lower than during the presidency of Bush. Also, 
the figure shows that Obama indeed did reach his goal of an overall reduction of 
greenhouse gasses during his years in office.  
 
Figure 3. “Greenhouse gas emission during presidency of Obama” 
 
Data retrieved from: 
https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/inventoryexplorer/#allsectors/allgas/econsect/all 
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unlike Bush Obama did manage to enact some of the bills on climate change and 
greenhouse gases. Despite his success in environmental legislation, Obama’s 
congressional composition has not always been in his favour. Especially during his 
second term the Congress had a majority of Republican representatives, making 
environmental legislation more difficult for him (“Composition of Congress, by 
Political Party, 1855-2017,”). The 112th and 113th Congress both had a republican 
majority and passed several bills that restricted the Obama Administration in 
regulating greenhouse gas emission. President Obama responded to these actions by 
clarifying that he intended to veto these particular proposals (Nachmany et al., 2014). 
Obama managed to sign at least 2 environmental bills every Congressional period 
(“Environmental Protection Bills - GovTrack.us,” n.d.). The data suggest Obama’s 
legislative climate policy matches his status of being a climate change believer.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. “Bills in the U.S. Congress related to the subject Environmental 
Protection during the presidency of Obama” 
 
 
Data retrieved from 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/subjects/environmental_protection/6038#congress=__ALL__ 
 
  
In 2015, the 21
st
 United Nations Climate agreement was adopted by 174 
nations. President Obama was the first US president to accept binding emission 
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targets and timetables in an international agreement (Clémençon, 2016). International 
cooperation on climate change had before proven to be very difficult, as Bush’s 
rejection of the Kyoto protocol suggests. Although restricted to a right-wing Congress 
with a majority of strong climate change ‘deniers’, Obama has worked hard to 
establish a cooperative spirit among developed countries and large emerging 
economies. His delegation’s high and cooperative spirit was argued to be extremely 
helpful in securing the Paris deal (Clémençon, 2016). He especially invested time and 
energy in the relationship with leaders of grand developing economies like China and 
India, who represent influential states when it comes to climate change (Clémençon, 
2016).  
 
6.3 Comparing Bush and Obama 
 
After analysing both President’s perception of climate change and their climate 
policy, it has become clear that to the extend of this particular case there is a relation 
between both variables. Although Bush claims otherwise, there are several indicators 
that suggest he is a denier. Obama, on the other hand, seems to be a firm believer. The 
result of this part of the results obviously has its flaws, for it is difficult to determine 
definitive characteristics of both believers and deniers. Although these labels cannot 
be distributed to the cases with complete certainty, the presented data suggest the 
plausibility of the labels for both presidents. When assuming them for the sake of this 
research one can conclude that the perception of climate change science of a US 
president has an effect on his climate policy. In all three tested areas of the climate 
policy variable, respectively greenhouse gas emission, environmental bills and 
international cooperation, the results indicate that there is a discrepancy between the 
policy of a believer and that of a denier. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
The research question ‘what is the effect of the perception of the US president on 
climate change science (believer/denier) on US climate policy’ has been tested by 
comparing two cases. These cases have contrasting independent variables, namely 
their perception of climate change science. This research tested the effect of this 
perception on the dependant variable of climate policy. The goal was to determine 
whether the role of individuals is of great significance to explain the US climate 
policy. Testing the effect of the perception of climate change of two presidents, with 
comparable circumstances but contrasting views, on their climate policy should 
present a reasonable indication for the importance of individuals.   
After having determined the plausibility of Bushes’ denier status, Obama’s status of 
climate science believer was substantiated. Then, both presidents’ climate policy was 
studied. The results suggest that an effect of the independent variable on the 
dependent variable is present. This would lead to the conclusion that a climate change 
science believer implements a different climate policy then a denier does. In its turn, 
this conclusion suggests that the individual (president) has an important role in 
establishing his/her (state) policy. This conclusion contrasts strongly with the 
discussed IR-theories perception of the creation of a state’s policy. According to 
realist theory, the state is the primary actor and the role of individuals can be 
dismissed. Realists assume the state is unitary and rational, thus will follow a certain 
path when deciding its policy that is in its own best interest. Common international 
policy is, according to realism, only possible when there is a hegemon on this issue. 
This research suggests that individual leaders have influence on state policy; therefore 
they should not be dismissed when examining state behaviour.  
 Even though the results indicate a relationship between both variables, it is too 
specific to determine with complete certainty that the individual influences a state’s 
behaviour. As suggested in the analysis, there might be other factors influencing the 
results of the climate policy. More research ought to be done to determine the 
suggested effect with certainty.  However, the effect that has been determined in this 
research is valuable to political science, for it suggests the importance of the 
individual in a state’s behaviour.  The case study on climate policy and a presidents’ 
perception of the issue clarifies the importance of the individual taking seat in the 
Oval Office. It creates grounds to further explore the influence an individual can have 
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on policy. Particularly, it provides a guideline to foresee and predict how a president’s 
perception of an issue could influence his policy.  
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